sterling, the conference would be broken off; nor did such an exchange
seem unreasonable, for were Russia expelled from the northern part of
Sakhalin, which commands the estuary of the Amur River, her position in
Siberia would have been compromised. But the statesmen who directed
Japan's affairs were not disposed to make any display of earth-hunger.
The southern half of Sakhalin had originally belonged to Japan and had
passed into Russia's possession by an arrangement which the Japanese
nation strongly resented. To recover that portion of the island seemed,
therefore, a legitimate ambition. Japan did not contemplate any larger
demand, nor did she seriously insist on an indemnity. Therefore the
negotiations were never in real danger of failure. The treaty of
Portsmouth recognized Japan's "paramount political, military and
economic interests" in Korea; provided for the simultaneous evacuation
of Manchuria by the contracting parties; transferred to Japan the lease
of the Liaotung peninsula held by Russia from China together with the
Russian railways south of Kwang-Cheng-tsze and all collateral mining or
other privileges; ceded to Japan the southern half of Sakhalin, the 50th
parallel of latitude to be the boundary between the two parts; secured
fishing rights for Japanese subjects along the coasts of the seas of
Japan, Okhotsk and Bering; laid down that the expenses incurred by the
Japanese for the maintenance of the Russian prisoners during the war
should be reimbursed by Russia, less the outlays made by the latter on
account of Japanese prisoners--by which arrangement Japan obtained a
payment of some 4 millions sterling--and provided that the contracting
parties, while withdrawing their military forces from Manchuria, might
maintain guards to protect their respective railways, the number of such
guards not to exceed 15 per kilometre of line. There were other
important restrictions: first, the contracting parties were to abstain
from taking, on the Russo-Korean frontier, any military measures which
might menace the security of Russian or Korean territory; secondly, the
two powers pledged themselves not to exploit the Manchurian railways for
strategic purposes; and thirdly, they promised not to build on Sakhalin
or its adjacent islands any fortifications or other similar military
works, or to take any military measures which might impede the free
navigation of the straits of La Pérouse and the Gulf of Tartary. The
above provisions concerned the two contracting parties only. But China's
interests also were considered. Thus it was agreed to "restore entirely
and completely to her exclusive administration" all portions of
Manchuria then in the occupation, or under the control, of Japanese or
Russian troops, except the leased territory; that her consent must be
obtained for the transfer to Japan of the leases and concessions held by
the Russians in Manchuria; that the Russian government would disavow the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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