[101] Cf. Plato, _Republic_, 381E seq. [102] _Elementa Philosophiæ_, i. 3. 20, i. 6. 17 seq. [103] Hobbes, _Elementa Philosophiæ_, i. 1. 5. [104] _Id. ib._ i. 6. 16. [105] _Id. ib._ i. 4. 8; cf. Locke's _Essay of Human Understanding_, iv. 17. [106] _Id. Leviathan_, i. 3. [107] _Id. Elem. Philos._ i. 6. 10. [108] Condillac, _Langue des Calculs_, p. 7. [109] Locke, _Essay_, iii. 3. [110] _Id. ib._ iv. 17. [111] _Loc. cit._ § 8. [112] _Id. ib._ iv. 4, §§ 6 sqq. [113] Berkeley, _Of the Principles of Human Knowledge_, § 142. [114] Hume, _Treatise of Human Nature_, i. 1. 7 (from Berkeley, _op. cit._, introd., §§ 15-16). [115] _Essay_, iv. 17, § 3. [116] Hume, _Treatise of Human Nature_, i. 3. 15. [117] Mill, _Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy_, cap. 17. [118] Cf. Mill, _Autobiography_, p. 159. "I grappled at once with the problem of Induction, postponing that of Reasoning." _Ib._ p. 182 (when he is preoccupied with syllogism), "I could make nothing satisfactory of Induction at this time." [119] _Autobiography_, p. 181. [120] The insight, for instance, of F. H. Bradley's criticism, _Principles of Logic_, II. ii. 3, is somewhat dimmed by a lack of sympathy due to extreme difference in the point of view adopted. [121] Bacon, _Novum organum_, i. 100. [122] Russell's _Philosophy of Leibnitz_, capp. 1-5. [123] See especially remarks on the letter of M. Arnauld (Gerhardt's edition of the philosophical works, ii. 37 sqq.). [124] Gerhardt, vi. 612, quoted by Russell, _loc. cit._, p. 19. [125] Ibid., ii. 62, Russell, p. 33. [126] Spinoza, ed. van Vloten and Land, i. 46 (_Ethica_, i. 11). [127] _Nouveaux essais_, iv. 2 § 9, 17 § 4 (Gerhardt v. 351, 460). [128] _Critique of Judgment_, Introd. § 2, _ad. fin._ (_Werke_, Berlin Academy edition, vol. v. p. 176, l. 10). [129] _Kant's Introduction to Logic and his Essay on the Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Figures_, trans. T. K. Abbott (1885). [130] _Loc. cit._, p. 11. [131] Or antitheses. Kant follows, for example, a different line of cleavage between form and content from that developed between thought and the "given." And these are not his only unresolved dualities, even in the _Critique of Pure Reason_. For the logical inquiry, however, it is permissible to ignore or reduce these differences. The determination too of the sense in which Kant's theory of knowledge involves an unresolved antithesis is for the logical purpose necessary so far only as it throws light upon his logic and his influence upon logical developments. Historically the question of the extent to which writers adopted the dualistic interpretation or one that had the like consequences is of greater importance.