Guizot arrived in London on February 28, and, on the following day in Paris, the Soult Cabinet was defeated and resigned. The King was, in consequence, reluctantly compelled to commission M. Thiers to form a government. Thiers, who himself assumed the direction of Foreign Affairs, was probably honestly desirous of maintaining a good understanding with England. But he was a convinced believer in the military strength of Mehemet Ali, and was determined to uphold his claim to the hereditary tenure of Syria. In his opinion, the _collective note of July_ 27, 1839, was the cause of all the difficulty; it was "the rut in which the coach had stuck."[533] But, although he was secretly resolved to escape from the obligations which his predecessors had contracted, he was not prepared openly to repudiate them. On the contrary, he admitted readily that he was bound to refrain from attempting to arrange matters between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, except in co-operation with the other signatory Powers. Should, however, the Sultan spontaneously agree to terms acceptable to the Pasha, the Powers could hardly interfere to prevent a settlement which the Porte itself pronounced satisfactory.[534] If such a result could be brought about, the _collective note_ would become a dead letter, and France would regain her full liberty of action. Moreover, Mehemet Ali would attain the object of his ambition in a large measure owing to the goodwill of the French government. Soult had instructed Guizot to declare that France was sincerely anxious to establish a permanent and lasting peace in the East. But to attain the desired result, she was convinced that Mehemet Ali must, at least, be given the hereditary tenure of Syria and Egypt. He was to impress upon Palmerston that the real object of the "trifling concessions," which Brunnow had been empowered to make, was to obtain the signature of England to some agreement to which France would refuse to adhere.[535] Thiers, in his first despatch, expressed his approval of these instructions, and of the language which M. Guizot had employed in carrying them out. He directed him to persevere with his arguments and constantly to impress upon the British government that France had no "_parti pris_," no "_système irrévocable_," nor was she bound by either promises or engagements to the Pasha. Her sole desire was to contribute to the establishment of peace upon a firm and durable foundation. The coercion of Mehemet Ali would demand a vast expenditure of military strength, and Lord Palmerston would, doubtless, agree that the armed intervention of Russia would greatly menace the independent existence of the Ottoman Empire.[536] Thiers, whose judgment on this, as on many other occasions, was greatly influenced by his hopes, was persuaded that the decision to call in a Turkish plenipotentiary, and the delay which it entailed, signified that the plans of Palmerston and Brunnow had encountered some serious obstacle.