But the longer the negotiations could be drawn out, the better he would be pleased. Whilst matters were drifting to a deadlock in London, his agents, he trusted, would be enabled quietly to effect some definite arrangement at Constantinople or at Cairo.[537] Guizot in his _Mémoires_ has described at length his proceedings in London. As he himself admits, he entertained an exaggerated belief in the strength of Mehemet Ali.[538] But, on the other hand, he had not Thiers' serene confidence that England would never conclude an agreement for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian question without the co-operation of France. On March 12, when relating a conversation he had had with Lord Palmerston in one of the drawing-rooms at Stafford House, he expressed the opinion "that the British government regarded the present moment as a favourable opportunity for settling affairs in the East, and that a sudden resolve might be taken to act without us." Again, a few days later, he sent M. Thiers a warning couched in more emphatic language. Full powers to conclude a convention, Lord Palmerston informed him, had been transmitted to Nourri-Effendi, the Turkish ambassador in Paris, who would shortly arrive in London. "It is possible, therefore, that we may be on the eve of important decisions. . . . The British government has two interests at stake in the eastern question--the wish to keep Russia from Constantinople and the fear of French influence in Egypt. . . . The present moment is looked upon as favourable for the attainment of these objects. By a singular combination of circumstances, Russia is both prepared to abandon her pretensions to exercise an exclusive protectorship over the Ottoman Empire, and to assist England to weaken the Pasha of Egypt. . . . Great Britain, consequently, is far from regarding the present situation as embarrassing, but on the contrary deems it a most fortunate development which she must make use of to the best advantage. . . . She is aware, however, that in prosecuting this policy she may impair her good understanding with France. To retain our friendship she will make some concessions, but I am disposed to think that she has no intention of allowing the present opportunity of attaining her ends in the East to escape."[539]