The French party in the Cabinet had recently received a great accession of strength. Lord John Russell, the Colonial Secretary and the leader of the House of Commons, had cordially approved of the Treaty of July 15. Nevertheless, early in September, he appears to have been seized with grave misgivings as to the wisdom of carrying out its provisions. A letter from Lord Spencer to his brother the Duke of Bedford, expressing the fear that Palmerston's policy would lead to a war with France, seems to have made a great impression upon him.[616] Moreover, "Bear" Ellice[617] was actively engaged in propagating alarmist rumours and in discoursing upon the indignation which the Anglo-Russian alliance had aroused in France. There are grounds for believing that the intrigue, of which he was the soul, aimed at driving Palmerston to resign, in order that Clarendon might replace him at the Foreign Office.[618] Be that as it may, the inspiration of M. Thiers can plainly be discerned in the correspondence of Mr. Ellice with both Russell and with Melbourne.[619] Charles Greville also appears to have spent much time with Guizot in inveighing against the presumptuous recklessness of Palmerston and in discussing the votes and opinions of different members of the Cabinet.[620] But the French ambassador could listen to even more congenial sentiments in the social circle presided over by Lord and Lady Holland. M. Thiers, a few weeks after Holland's death, openly declared in the Chamber that, throughout this crisis, he had always been able to depend upon the support of that statesman.[621] It is impossible to say how far he was justified in making such a statement. It is undeniable, however, that matters, which should have been treated as Cabinet secrets, were known in Paris. In commenting upon M. Thiers' amazing indiscretion, _The Times_,[622] which cannot be charged with partiality to Palmerston, positively asserted, as a notorious fact, that "every transaction within the doors of the British council-chamber were as well known upon the _bourse_ as in the deepest recesses of Downing Street or Whitehall." This statement is to a great extent confirmed by Bulwer, who relates that, in consequence of certain information which he had acquired in Paris, he was enabled to warn Palmerston of an attack which was to be made upon him in the Cabinet.[623] "The talking at Holland House," wrote Lord Melbourne, "is irremediable. They cannot help it, and they are not themselves aware how much they talk."[624] It was always a subject of complaint against Palmerston that he would come to important decisions and would embark upon grave measures of policy, without reference to his colleagues. The conduct of certain of his "Whig friends and grandees"[625] upon this occasion was, it must be admitted, calculated to dispose him to confide in them as seldom as possible.