No sooner had M. Guizot emerged successfully from the initial stages of the parliamentary struggle, than he applied himself diligently to the task of bringing back France into the Concert of the Powers. The German Courts, he was well aware, were most anxious to terminate a situation pregnant with dangerous possibilities. In the eyes of Metternich and of Baron Werther, the Prussian minister, the isolation of France threatened the peace of Europe, and, in order to put an end to it, they were prepared to settle "_tant bien que mal_,"[682] the eastern question. Under ordinary circumstances the Tsar Nicholas might have been expected to oppose the resumption by France of her place in the Concert of the Powers. But he had now strong reasons of his own for desiring that her isolation should cease. He had instructed Brunnow to undertake that the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi should not be renewed, because experience had proved that it was of no practical value.[683] The Cabinet of St. Petersburg had arrived at the conclusion that, for the better protection of the southern provinces of Russia, the question of the Dardanelles should be regulated by some European agreement. But no compact of that nature would be likely to endure, unless France were to be made a party to it.[684] Although it suited Nicholas that France should re-enter the European Concert, his dislike of Louis Philippe, and of the _régime_ of July was as strong as ever. Whilst proposing to close the eastern question with some "final transaction to which France might be invited to adhere,"[685] he also suggested that the treaty for the pacification of the Levant should be converted into a quadruple alliance, "providing against the contingency of an attack by France upon the liberties of Europe." His main reason, he informed Lord Clanricarde, for making this proposal, was to establish a close understanding with Great Britain.[686] Metternich had not "the spirit of a gentleman," and neither England nor Russia ought to place any confidence in him.[687] The British government, however, was unable to entertain the suggestion. "All formal engagements of the Crown," Lord Clanricarde was instructed to explain, "must be submitted to Parliament, and Parliament might not approve of an engagement which should bind England prospectively." Nor was there any way in which this difficulty could be overcome. It would not be removed by the verbal agreement into which the Imperial Cabinet had declared its readiness to enter, should the constitutional obstacles to the conclusion of a more formal compact prove insuperable. "A verbal engagement would bind the ministers who made it, but might be disavowed by their successors, and thus the Russian government might be led to count upon a system of policy which might not eventually be pursued. . . . Under these circumstances," concluded Lord Palmerston, "it seems to Her Majesty's government that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg should be satisfied to