Essays in Literature and HistoryFroude, James Anthony
History
Essays in Literature and History
Froude, James Anthony
History; Literature
Although, however, we may justly quarrel with such
unlooked-for difficulties, the important question, after
all, is not of their obscurity but of their truth. Many
things in all the sciences are obscure to an unpractised
understanding, which are true enough and clear
enough to people acquainted with the subjects, and
may be fairly laid as foundations of a scientific system,
although rudimentary students must be contented to
accept them upon faith. Of course it is entirely
competent to Spinoza, or to any one, to define the terms
which he intends to use just as he pleases, provided
it be understood that any conclusions which he derives
out of them apply only to the ideas so defined, and not
to any supposed object existing which corresponds with
them. Euclid defines his triangles and circles, and
discovers that to figures so described certain properties
previously unknown may be proved to belong; but as
in nature there are no such things as triangles and
circles exactly answering the definition, his conclusions,
as applied to actually existing objects, are either not
true at all or only proximately so. Whether it be
possible to bridge over the gulf between existing things
and the abstract conception of them, as Spinoza attempts
to do, we shall presently see. It is a royal road to
certainty if it be a practicable one, but we cannot say
that we ever met any one who could say honestly
Spinoza had convinced him; and power of demonstration,
like all other powers, can be judged only
by its effects. Does it prove? does it produce conviction?
If not, it is nothing. We need not detain
our readers among these abstractions. The real power
of Spinozism does not lie so remote from ordinary
appreciation, or we should long ago have heard the last
of it. Like all other systems which have attracted
followers, it addresses itself not to the logical intellect
but to the imagination, which it affects to set aside.
We refuse to submit to the demonstrations by which
it thrusts itself upon our reception, but regarding it
as a whole, as an attempt to explain the nature of the
world, of which we are a part, we can still ask ourselves
how far the attempt is successful. Some account of
these things we know that there must be, and the
curiosity which asks the question regards itself, of
course, as competent in some degree to judge of the
answer to it. Before proceeding, however, to regard
this philosophy in the aspect in which it is really
powerful, we must clear our way through the fallacy
of the method.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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