Essays in Literature and HistoryFroude, James Anthony
History
Essays in Literature and History
Froude, James Anthony
History; Literature
The system is evolved in a series of theorems in
severely demonstrative order out of the definitions and
axioms which we have translated. To propositions 1--6
we have nothing to object; they will not, probably,
convey any very clear ideas, but they are so far purely
abstract, and seem to follow (as far as we can speak
of "following," in such subjects), by fair reasoning.
"Substance is prior in nature to its affections."
"Substances with different attributes have nothing in
common," and therefore "one cannot be the cause of the
other." "Things really distinct are distinguished by
difference either of attribute or mode (there being
nothing else by which they can be distinguished), and
therefore, because things modally distinguished do not
qua substance differ from one another, there cannot be
more than one substance of the same attribute; and
therefore (let us remind our readers that we are among
what Spinoza calls notiones simplicissimas), since there
cannot be two substances of the same attribute and
substances of different attributes cannot be the cause
one of the other, it follows that no substances can be
produced by another substance."
The existence of substance, he then concludes, is
involved in the nature of the thing itself. Substance
exists. It does and must. We ask, why? and we
are answered, because there is nothing capable of
producing it, and therefore it is self-caused; i.e. by
the first definition the essence of it implies existence
as part of the idea. It is astonishing that Spinoza
should not have seen that he assumes the fact that
substance does exist in order to prove that it must. If
it cannot be produced and exists, then, of course, it
exists in virtue of its own nature. But supposing it
does not exist, supposing it is all a delusion, the proof
falls to pieces, unless we fall back on the facts of
experience, on the obscure and unscientific certainty that
the thing which we call the world, and the personalities
which we call ourselves, are a real substantial
something. Conscious of the infirmity of his demonstration,
he winds round it and round it, adding proof to proof,
but never escaping the same vicious circle: substance
exists because it exists, and the ultimate experience of
existence, so far from being of that clear kind which
can be accepted as an axiom, is the most confused of all
our sensations. What is existence? and what is that
something which we say exists? Things--essences--
existences; these are but the vague names with which
faculties, constructed only to deal with conditional
phenomena, disguise their incapacity. The world
in the Hindoo legend rested upon the back of the
tortoise. It was a step between the world and nothingness,
and served to cheat the imagination with ideas
of a fictitious resting-place.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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