Indeed, I will incidentally remark that I suspect the word "intuition" has been a very good addition to our vocabulary, and I suppose its proper import might be represented as follows:--Reason has two modes of his exercise, the one is called reasoning, and the other intuition. Intuition is the decision of reason on one single point; reasoning--a word proper to demonstrative truth--seems to be nothing more than intuition looking not merely at one point, but at several points successively. So that intuition and reasoning would constitute the self-same function of reason, and the difference in their meanings would be solely owing to the difference in the circumstances under which that function is exercised. Observe, that I am here only venturing to speculate, and am now returning from that digression. Whether or not Locke is herein psychologically consistent with himself; whether, indeed, his real theory is not that which I have just conjecturally intimated, is another question, which I shall defer to a future occasion; but whether or not he herein opposes the ordinary, prevailing, and inveterate use of language, which is what I am charging him with doing, and whether or not he has justifiable ground for this innovation which I am denying that he has, are points that must be tried by the ordeal of these three considerations. How are we accustomed to speak? How are we accustomed to write? and what sort of a call for changing our customs in either of these particulars is that which constitutes a genuine call to do so? In regard to the first of these tests, the literature of all sects and parties has been accustomed to assert that, both in matters of science and of worldly business, reason is the judge of all truth whatever, without exception. Locke, on the other hand, informs us that reason is the judge of demonstrative truth, of logical truth, of casuistical truth, and of lawyers' truth, and of these kinds of truth alone, but is not the judge of intuitive or self-evident truth. Our writers would tell us that to deny "what is, is" to be a true statement, would be an offence against reason; but we learn from Locke that reason has no cognisance in this matter, but intuition only has, and consequently that the wrong committed would not be against reason, but against intuition. Our current speech accords with our literature in this view of the meaning of the word reason; whose efficiency, moreover, it endeavors to amplify, by surrounding it with satellites of adjectives formed from it, the principal of which are "reasonable" and "unreasonable." Provided with this vocabulary, we pronounce it to be unreasonable to deny any truth whatever that can be well and clearly ascertained; and so far are we from reserving these adjectives for the occasion of demonstrative truth, and holding them inapplicable where self-evident or intuitive truth comes on the carpet, that we account it, if possible, still more unreasonable to deny the latter than the former.