LIV. Whoever tells you, sir, that from an apprehension of Cæsar, you should destroy Pompey, would persuade you to fear men more than the gods. I will suppose Cæsar to be so unjust, as to be capable of thanking you for putting Pompey to death, and of being irritated against you for not doing it. This same act of flattery to Cæsar, is so palpable an offence against heaven, that he who advises you to it, cannot possibly entertain a doubt of its being such; for if he should tell you, that by such a conduct you would conform to the will of the gods, who have declared themselves favourable to Cæsar, he would advance a sophistry unworthy to be heard in so august and solemn an assembly; for what delirium is it to imagine, that we may continue to oppress those, who groan under the weight of adverse fortune, upon a pretence, of co-operating with the Supreme Providence? According to this mode of reasoning, it would be right to give a sick man poison instead of medicine, instead of binding up the sores of the wounded, to cut and stab him afresh, and instead of succouring the poor, to take from him the little he has. The gods are able to make people unhappy, for this is a prerogative annexed to their sovereign power, which they sometimes exert, by way of exercising the patience and constancy of those they afflict, and with a view of affording to others an opportunity of manifesting their clemency, and of administering to the misfortunes of the distressed. Thus he who lends a compassionate hand to assist those whom the gods have thought fit to make unhappy, does not counteract their dispensations, but rather shews a compliance with, and an obedience to, the immutable principles of their laws. LV. To insinuate to you, in order to make Pompey a delinquent, that by seeking an asylum here, he sought the ruin of your kingdom, amounts to the same thing, as saying he meditates burning the temple, who from the fury of his enemies, takes refuge at the altars of it. Pompey does not pretend to compel, but only intreats you; neither, in his intreaty, does he point out the bounds to which you should extend your protection to him; nor although he should point them out, could any consequences be deduced from thence to your disadvantage; for that cannot take away from you, neither now, nor at any time after he shall have put himself into your hands, the right of deliberating upon, and after a just estimation of your power, your obligation, and your risk, of determining to act by him, as the urgency of your affairs may make it necessary. Furthermore, if you reflect, you will find that he has a right to demand your protection, although it may be dangerous for you to afford it him. You owe to him the sceptre you now sway, which he restored to your father; nor is the probable hazard of the same crown, which was certainly restored to you, an adequate recompence to the man who restored it.