XXV. And here it will be proper to remark, that this debt is not barred or cancelled by any uncertainty that may arise concerning the origin of those who are accepted as nobles. The reason is, because their being generally acknowledged and received as such, is sufficient to place them in that degree of superiority; for we cannot require more examination of their descent, in order to respect them, than the laws require which favour them. He would be a very extraordinary man, who could arrive at giving physical proof of who is his father; but his not being able to do this, does not absolve any one from the indispensable obligation of reverencing the man as such, who is generally esteemed and reputed to be his father. XXVI. This debt of veneration to the nobility, should be understood in all cases, with a reservation of what is due, and properly appertains to virtue, which, according to the constant doctrine of Aristotle, and St. Thomas, is much more worthy of honour than nobility; therefore, even with that civil and extrinsic honour, which in their ethics those two great masters speak of, we ought more to reverence a virtuous Plebeian, than a Nobleman without virtue. Our cardinal Aguirre, when he is explaining philosophy, in the third chapter of his fourth book of ethics, says, that a vicious nobleman is unworthy of all honour and respect; to which sentiment I subscribe, because it is conformable to a maxim of the angelic doctor, who (22 quæst. 145. art. I.) having said, that honour properly and principally was only due to virtue, admits, that other qualities and excellences inferior to her, such as nobility, riches, and power, are only honourable in proportion as they conduce to, and assist the operations of virtue: _Alia vero, quæ sunt infra virtutem, honorantur in quantum coadjuvant ad opera virtutis, sicut nobilitas, potentia, & divitiæ._ If the nobility then do not assist virtue, but rather foment vanity and nourish pride, by lending their suffrages to vices which obstruct virtue, they render themselves totally unworthy of the least respect. SECT. VI. XXVII. But how shall we reconcile what we have just now said against the nobility, with what we said but a little before in their favour? Easily, by saying this prerogative is not laudable, but honourable. The arguments we have just urged impugn its laudabillty, those we are about to use are affirmative of its honour. This is a distinction pointed out by Aristotle, between virtue and all the other excellences which illustrate the human race. Virtue, he says, is laudable; riches, nobility, and power, deserve no praise, but have a pretension to be honoured. So that there is nothing in nobility which a man should boast or be vain of; but there is something in it, which those who are inferior to them in rank should reverence and respect. This distinction will reconcile all difficulties, and assure to the nobility esteem, without fomenting their vanity. SECT. VII.