XXV. It is a common error, to apply to determined or particular species of sins only, the excuse of the frailty of human nature. This frailty as transcendent in all the passions, intervenes in all kinds of slips. There is no vice, which has not its natural fermentation in the complexion of the individual. The disorders which are the most distant from, or opposite to the reasonable faculties, find their patronage in the sensible ones. I confess I cannot comprehend, how in our nature, there can be contained geniuses so perverse, that they should take pleasure in doing mischief to other people, when by the act, no sensible good can result to themselves. With all this, it is certain that there are such people, and it is also certain, they behave in this manner, because they are under the dominion of this villainous disposition. But observe of what this frailty is compounded. If their malignant conduct did not afford them some considerable delight, they would not for the sake of indulging it run the hazard of incurring the public hatred. XXVI. But it is proper to remark, that these men of whom we have been speaking, and who are compounded of virtue and vice, are not what they seem to be by their outside appearance. I mean, that even the virtues they are supposed to possess, will upon enquiry be found not so properly to deserve the name of virtues, as that of the mere want or absence of vices. Observe Chrysantus: he abstains from all commerce with the other sex; and you may be led to think, this abstinence proceeds from virtue; but you would mistake, for it is the effect of insensibility; he has no stimulus which incites him to desire women, and therefore we may conclude, there is no more merit in his continence, than may be imputed to the trunk of a tree. If his abstinence had been the effect of his fear of God, he would not have been so inattentive to his conscience in other respects. Observe Aurelius: he is very sparing and moderate in his diet, both with regard to eating and drinking. You may conclude this proceeds from temperance; no such thing: Aurelius wants an appetite; the case of him, in this respect, is like that of a man in a fever, who forbears to eat, because he is not able; but you see, he is capable of swallowing all the goods and money he can lay his hands on; from whence we may suppose, that if his stomach was as voracious as his heart, he would be another Heliogabalus. XXVII. These are hypocrites by constitution; and temperament compleats in them, what study does in other people; theirs is not virtue, but only the semblance or image of it, although it is an image which is not formed by art, but nature.