XXXVIII. With respect to certain sorts of crimes, in some instances where I have wished to see Judges very solicitous to inflict punishment, I have observed them very indulgent. I speak of those faults in the practice of the law, which are committed by people of the profession, and those who know the true state and secrets of causes, and who intervene as instruments in the prosecution of them; such as the advocate, the solicitor, or the attorney, to which we may add the witnesses also. The tribunal is a whole of such delicate contexture, that there is no integral part of it whatever, which is not essential. It is a machine, in which, a failure, false construction, or weakness of the most minute wheel, disorders all its movements. Of what avail is it, that the Judges are upright, if the proceedings and informations come adulterated to their hands and ears? The greater their integrity, the more certain in the issue would be the pronunciation of a false and unjust sentence; because the judgment would be founded, on the vitiated proceedings and testimony which had been laid before them. Among the Japanese, they punish with the utmost severity, all false information which is given to Judges with respect to causes they are trying, even when it is preferred by a party interested. This appears to me excellent policy. The way to make the road to justice smooth and secure, is to disincumber it of all impediments to the advancement of truth; and to do this, there is no alternative, but that of punishing lyes with the utmost severity. XXXIX. If it is objected, that this would be excess of rigour, because the punishment might exceed the proportion of the crime; I answer, that Lawyers should weigh crimes in a different manner from Theologians. The Theologian examines the intrinsic malice or evil of the act: the lawyer attends to the consequences that may result to the public; and these may be important, although the fault may at first sight appear light and trifling. It is true, that the Theologian considers the consequences also, when it appears that the delinquent foresaw them, and in that case regards this circumstance as a proportionable aggravation of the crime _in foro conscientiæ_. The Lawyer cannot, nor does it belong to him, to enquire whether the culprit foresaw them; for he is only to apply the remedy the law has prescribed to prevent the mischief; and thus, for the sake of example to the world at large, the offender is punished in the same manner as if he had actually foreseen the mischief.