Essays, or discourses, vol. 2 (of 4) : $b Selected from the works of Feyjoo, and translated from the SpanishFeijoo, Benito Jerónimo
Philosophy
Essays, or discourses, vol. 2 (of 4) : $b Selected from the works of Feyjoo, and translated from the Spanish
Feijoo, Benito Jerónimo
Spanish essays -- Translations into English
LVIII. We shall describe these people, by giving the character and
behaviour of Philotimus. Philotimus is a man, who at all times is
dinning in people’s ears the professions of his ingenuousness, and
declaiming till he is out of breath against adulation. He is ever
dwelling upon his immutable love of truth, which he uses as a sort of
coupling, to all the insinuations he throws out against this or that
person. He rudely tells a man his faults to his face, and then shelters
himself under the pretence, that when an occasion presents itself for
his doing it, he cannot refrain from speaking the truth, for all the
gratifications and indulgences the world can afford. If he hears any
person praised, be he absent or present, in whose conduct he conceives
there is something reprehensible, he immediately gives vent to his
spleen, and tells all he knows or has ever heard to that person’s
prejudice, and reproaches those who have spoke well of him, with having
flattered or been partial to him; and then immediately pleads his great
love of truth, as a justification for what he has done.
LIX. What shall we say of such a man? We may venture to pronounce,
that there is much more stuff about him, than is necessary to form
either a fool or a rustic; and that he is an extravagant babbler, who
in his conversation observes no order or bounds; that he is a rude,
yea a very rude unpolished man, who does not understand the difference
between servile adulation, and bare-faced effrontery. He being such a
sort of man, why should those who hear him regard any thing he says?
Or who can believe that he is capable of forming a just opinion of
matters or things, who is so far infatuated as to overlook, or not
attend to the maxims, which natural reason has so clearly dictated
and pointed out? But if we were to admit that he does not err in the
conception he forms of things, we must at least grant, that he errs in
his mode of advancing his opinions, if he prefers them out of time,
inopportunely, and without method. Has he peradventure a royal licence
or patent, for being the superintendent or corrector of other men’s
manners and conduct? But admitting for argument’s sake, that he is a
man of as great veracity as he pretends to be, which by the way is what
I very much doubt of; for my experience has convinced me, that if it
does not apply to every individual, that fine sentence is most true
and applicable to the bulk of mankind, which I have read somewhere,
although I can’t remember in what author, and is as follows: _Veritatem
nulli frequentius lædunt, quam qui frequentius jactant. There are no
people lie more frequently, than those who are always boasting of their
veracity._ I say, admitting that they are as sincere as they pretend
to be, does their being men of veracity give them a right to go about
cudgeling, and breaking the heads of all the world? Truth, according
to the doctrine of St. Paul, is the beloved companion of charity:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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