Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
Whether, by “the metaphysical view,” is here meant the view of Kant,
whether it means Dr. Hodgson’s own view, or whether the expression has
a more general meaning, I have simply to reply that the metaphysical
view is incorrect. Dealing with the Kantian version of this doctrine,
that Space is a form of intuition, I have pointed out that only with
certain classes of phenomena is Space united indissolubly; that Kant
habitually considers phenomena belonging to the visual and tactual
groups, with which the consciousness of space is inseparably joined,
and overlooks groups with which it is not inseparably joined. Though
in the adult, perception of sound has certain space-implications,
mostly, if not wholly, acquired by individual experience; and though it
would seem from the instructive experiments of Mr. Spalding, that in
creatures born with nervous systems much more organized than our own
are at birth, {227} there is some innate perception of the side from
which a sound comes; yet it is demonstrable that the space-implications
of sound are not originally given with the sensation as its form
of intuition. Bearing in mind the Kantian doctrine, that Space is
the form of sensuous intuitions not only as _presented_ but also as
_represented_, let us examine critically our musical ideas. As I have
elsewhere suggested to the reader―
“Let him observe what happens when some melody takes possession of
his imagination. Its tones and cadences go on repeating themselves
apart from any space-consciousness—they are not localized. He may or
may not be reminded of the place where he heard them—this association
is incidental only. Having observed this, he will see that such
space-implications as sounds have, are learnt in the course of
individual experience, and are not given with the sounds themselves.
Indeed, if we refer to the Kantian definition of form, we get a simple
and conclusive proof of this. Kant says form is ‘that which effects
that the content of the phænomenon can be arranged under certain
relations.’ How then can the content of the phenomenon we call sound
be arranged? Its parts can be arranged in order of sequence—that is,
in Time. But there is no possibility of arranging its parts in order
of coexistence—that is, in Space. And it is just the same with odour.
Whoever thinks that sound and odour have Space for their form of
intuition, may convince himself to the contrary by trying to find the
right and left sides of a sound, or to imagine an odour turned the
other way upwards.”—_Principles of Psychology_, § 399.—Note.
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