Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
As I thus dissent, not I think without good reason, from “the
metaphysical view of Space and Time” as “elements in all phenomena,”
it will naturally be expected that I dissent from the first criticism
which Dr. Hodgson proceeds to deduce from it. Dealing first with the
arguments I have used to show the incomprehensibility of Space and
Time, if we consider them as objective, and stating in other words the
conclusion I draw, that “as Space and Time cannot be either nonentities
nor the attributes of entities, we have no choice but to consider them
as entities.” Dr. Hodgson continues:―
“So far good. Secondly, he argues that they cannot be represented
in thought as such real existences, because ‘to be conceived at
all, a thing must be conceived as having attributes.’ Now here the
metaphysical doctrine enables us to conceive them as real existences,
and rebuts the argument for {228} their inconceivability; for the
other element, the material element, the feeling or quality occupying
Space and Time stands in the place and performs the function of the
required attributes, composing together with the space and time which
is occupied the empirical phenomena of perception. So far as this
argument of Mr. Spencer goes, then, we are entitled to say that his
case for the inconceivability of Space and Time as real existences is
not made out.”
Whether the fault is in me or not I cannot say, but I fail to see
that my argument is thus rebutted. On the contrary, it appears to me
substantially conceded. What kind of entity is that which can exist
only when occupied by something else? Dr. Hodgson’s own argument is
a tacit assertion that Space _by itself_ cannot be conceived as an
existence; and this is all that I have alleged.
Dr. Hodgson deals next with the further argument, familiar to all
readers, which I have added as showing the insurmountable difficulty
in the way of conceiving Space and Time as objective entities; namely,
that “all entities which we actually know as such are limited. . . .
But of Space and Time we cannot assert either limitation, or the
absence of limitation.” Without quoting at length the reasons Dr.
Hodgson gives for distinguishing between Space as _per_ceived and Space
as _con_ceived, it will suffice if I quote his own statement of the
result to which they bring him: “So that Space and Time as perceived
are not finite, but infinite, as conceived are not infinite, but
finite.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account