Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
On the face of it the anomaly seems great; but I should have thought
that after reading the chapter on “Transfigured Realism,” a critic of
Mr. Sidgwick’s acuteness would have seen the solution of it. He has
overlooked an essential distinction. All which my argument implies is
that the direct intuition of Realism must be held of superior authority
to the arguments of Anti-Realism, _where their deliverances cannot
be reconciled_. The one point on which their deliverances cannot be
reconciled, is the existence of an objective reality. But while,
against this intuition of Realism, I hold the arguments of Anti-Realism
to be powerless, because they cannot be carried on without postulating
that which they end by denying; yet, having admitted objective
existence as a necessary postulate, it is possible to make valid
criticisms upon all those judgments which Crude Realism joins with
this primordial judgment: it is possible to show that a transfigured
interpretation of properties and relations, is more tenable than the
original interpretation.
To elucidate the matter, let us take the most familiar case in which
the indirect judgments of Reason correct the direct judgments of Common
Sense. The direct judgment of Common Sense is that the Sun moves round
the Earth. In course of time, Reason, finding some facts at variance
with this, begins to doubt; and, eventually, hits upon an hypothesis
which explains the anomalies, but which denies this apparently-certain
_dictum_ of Common Sense. What is the reconciliation? It consists in
showing {244} to Common Sense that the new interpretation equally
well corresponds with direct intuition, while it avoids all the
difficulties. Common Sense is reminded that the apparent motion of
an object may be due either to its actual motion or to the motion of
the observer; and that there are terrestrial experiences in which the
observer thinks an object he looks at is moving, when the motion is in
himself. Extending the conception thus given, Reason shows that if the
Earth revolves on its axis, there will result that apparent motion of
the Sun which Common Sense interpreted into an actual motion of the
Sun; and the common-sense observer thereupon becomes able to think
of sunrise and sunset as due to his position as spectator on a vast
revolving globe. Now if the astronomer, setting out by recognizing
these celestial appearances, and proceeding to evolve the various
anomalies following from the common-sense interpretation of them, had
drawn the conclusion that there externally exist no Sun and no motion
at all, he would have done what Idealists do; and his arguments would
have been equally powerless against the intuition of Common Sense. But
he does nothing of the kind. He accepts the intuition of Common Sense
respecting the reality of the Sun and of the motion; but replaces the
old interpretation of the motion by a new interpretation reconcilable
with all the facts.
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