Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
Everyone must see that here, acceptance of the inexpugnable element
in the common-sense judgment, by no means involves acceptance of the
accompanying judgments; and I contend that the like discrimination must
be made in the case we are considering. It does not follow that while,
against the consciousness which Crude Realism has of an objective
reality, the arguments of Anti-Realism are futile, they are therefore
futile against the conceptions which Crude Realism forms of the
objective reality. If Anti-Realism can show that, granting an objective
reality, the interpretation of Crude Realism contains insuperable {245}
difficulties, the process is quite legitimate. And, its primordial
intuition remaining unshaken, Realism may, on reconsideration, be
enabled to frame a new conception which harmonizes all the facts.
To show that there is not here the “mazy inconsistency” alleged, let
us take the case of sound as interpreted by Crude Realism, and as
re-interpreted by Transfigured Realism. Crude Realism assumes the
sound present in consciousness to exist as such beyond consciousness.
Anti-Realism proves the inadmissibility of this assumption in sundry
ways (all of which, however, set out by talking of sounding bodies
beyond consciousness, just as Realism talks of them); and then
Anti-Realism concludes that we know of no existence save the sound as a
mode of consciousness: which conclusion, and all kindred conclusions,
I contend are vicious—first, because all the words used connote an
objective activity; second, because the arguments are impossible
without postulating at the outset an objective activity; and third,
because no one of the intuitions out of which the arguments are built,
is of equal validity with the single intuition of Realism that an
objective activity exists. But now the Transfigured Realism which
Mr. Sidgwick thinks “has all the serious incongruity of an intense
metaphysical dream,” neither affirms the untenable conception of Crude
Realism, nor, like Anti-Realism, draws unthinkable conclusions by
suicidal arguments; but, accepting that which is essential in Crude
Realism, and admitting the difficulties which Anti-Realism insists
upon, reconciles matters by a re-interpretation analogous to that
which an astronomer makes of the solar motion. Continuing all along
to recognize an objective activity which Crude Realism calls sound,
it shows that the answering sensation is produced by a succession of
separate impacts which, if made slowly, may be separately identified,
and which will, if progressively increased in rapidity, produce tones
higher and higher in pitch. It {246} shows by other experiments that
sounding bodies are in states of vibration, and that the vibrations
may be made visible. And it concludes that the objective activity
is not what it subjectively seems, but is proximately interpretable
as a succession of aërial waves. Thus Crude Realism is shown that
while there unquestionably exists an objective activity corresponding
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account