Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
Comte should have persisted in attempting to construct “_une échelle
encyclopédique_.”
The metaphor which M. Comte has here so inconsistently used to express
the relations of the sciences—branches of one trunk—is an approximation
to the truth, though not the truth itself. It suggests the facts that
the sciences had a common origin; that they have been developing
simultaneously; and that they have been from time to time dividing
and sub-dividing. But it fails to suggest the fact, that the {29}
divisions and sub-divisions thus arising do not remain separate, but
now and again re-unite in direct and indirect ways. They inosculate;
they severally send off and receive connecting growths; and the
intercommunion has been ever becoming more frequent, more intricate,
more widely ramified. There has all along been higher specialization,
that there might be a larger generalization; and a deeper analysis,
that there might be a better synthesis. Each larger generalization has
lifted sundry specializations still higher; and each better synthesis
has prepared the way for still deeper analysis.
And here we may fitly enter upon the task awhile since indicated—a
sketch of the Genesis of Science, regarded as a gradual outgrowth
from common knowledge—an extension of the perceptions by the aid
of the reason. We propose to treat it as a psychological process
historically displayed; tracing at the same time the advance from
qualitative to quantitative prevision; the progress from concrete facts
to abstract facts, and the application of such abstract facts to the
analysis of new orders of concrete facts; the simultaneous advance
in generalization and specialization; the continually increasing
subdivision and reunion of the sciences; and their constantly improving
_consensus_.
* * * * *
To trace out scientific evolution from its deepest roots would, of
course, involve a complete analysis of the mind. For as science is a
development of that common knowledge acquired by the unaided senses and
uncultured reason, so is that common knowledge itself gradually built
up out of the simplest perceptions. We must, therefore, begin somewhere
abruptly; and the most appropriate stage to take for our point of
departure will be the adult mind of the savage.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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