Essays Towards a Theory of KnowledgePhilip, Alexander
Philosophy
Essays Towards a Theory of Knowledge
Philip, Alexander
Cycles; Force and energy; Knowledge, Theory of
Behind and beneath all these considerations we should never lose sight
of the great main facts--that thought is an activity; that its function
therefore is to represent or reproduce our pure exertional activity;
that such representation is _at the basis_ of all our concepts of
externality; that sensation, _per se_ is mere interruption of activity;
that _per se_ it possesses no spatial or extensive or external
suggestiveness; that sensations nevertheless serve to denote or give
feature and particularity to our experience of activity; that all
perception of the external is at bottom therefore a mental
representation of exertional activity and its forms, denoted,
punctuated, identified by sensation, which latter by itself, we repeat,
carries no suggestion of externality. This view revolutionises the whole
psychology of Perception, and therefore, though it at once gives to that
science a much-needed unity, clarity, and simplicity, it will naturally
be accepted with reluctance by the laborious authors of the cumbrous
theories still generally current.
FOOTNOTES:
[18:1] His reason is that we _ab origine_ localise sensations with
reference to our organism. This, of course, means by reference to the
system of potent energy in which our organism essentially consists.
III
THE TWO TYPICAL THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE
The evolution of living organisms is in general a gradual and continuous
process. But it is nevertheless true that it presents well-marked stages
and can best be described by reference to these. Frequently, moreover,
the meaning and true nature of the movement at one stage is only
revealed after a subsequent stage has been reached.
The development of a brain or cerebrum marks one important advance. The
presence of this organ renders possible to the animal in varying degree
what are called representations of objects, and the faculty of making
such representations appears to be a condition precedent to the
development of deliberation, volition, and purposive action as opposed
to reflex or instinctive activity. The latter is specially
characteristic of other orders of organic existence such as the
Articulata--being remarkably exemplified in the activities of the social
insects such as the bee.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account