"A Good Will is good, not because of what it performs or effects, _not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end_, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself.... Even if it should happen that, owing to the special disfavor of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the Good Will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the assuming of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its fruitfulness or fruitlessness can neither add nor take away anything from this value." And again he says: "An action ... derives its moral worth not from the _purpose_ which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined and therefore depends ... merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any _object of desire_.... The purposes which we may have in view in our actions or their effect regarded as ends and springs of will cannot give the actions an unconditional or moral worth.... It cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of the Will, without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action" (_Ibid._, p. 16). =Relation of Endeavor and Achievement to Will.=--Here, also, we find a certain agreement with our every-day moral experience. It is undoubtedly true that in many cases we ascribe moral worth or goodness to acts without reference to the results actually attained by them; a man who tries to rescue a drowning child is not judged only on the basis of success. If he is prevented, because he is crippled, or because the current is too rapid for him, we do not refuse hearty moral approbation. We do not judge the goodness of the act or of the agent from the standpoint of its attained result, which here is failure. We regard the man as good because he proposed to himself a worthy end or aim, the rescue of another, even at the risk of harm to himself. We should agree with Kant in saying that the moral worth does not depend on the _realization_ of the object of desire. But we should regard the worth of the man to consist precisely in the fact that, so far as he was concerned, he _aimed at a good result_. We do not rule out purpose, but we approve because the purpose was good. By will we mean tendencies, desires, and habits operating to realize results regarded as desirable. Will is not the _sole_ condition of reaching a result--that is, of making the aim an actual fact. Circumstances need to coöperate to insure a successful issue; and if these fail, the best will in the world cannot secure the transformation of desire for an end into that end. We know that sometimes it is only by accident that the desirable end is not