effected, but we also know that without the proper disposition it is only by accident that the results _are_ achieved. Moreover, we know that our own attitude is not only an important condition of securing the results, but that it is the only condition _constantly_ under our control. What we mean by calling it "ours" is precisely that it is that condition whose operation lies with us. Accordingly, it is the key and clue to the results, so far as they concern us. So far, given desire and endeavor, achievement is not necessary to volition. ="Meaning Well."=--On the other hand, can a man justify himself on the ground that he "means well," if the "meaning well" does not _regulate the overt acts_ that he performs, and hence the consequences that proceed from them? Are we not justified in suspecting a person's good faith when his good intentions uniformly bring suffering to others? If we do not question his good faith, do we not regard him as needing moral enlightenment, and a change of disposition? We distinguish in our judgments of good between the fanatic and the thoroughly selfish man, but we do not carry this distinction to the point of approving the fanatic; of saying, "Let him alone; he means well, he has a good will, he is actuated by a sense of duty." On the contrary, we condemn his aims; and in so far we censure him for willingly entertaining ans approving them. We may, indeed, approve of his character with respect to its sincerity, singleness of aim, and its thoroughness of effort, for such things, _taken by themselves_, or in the abstract, are good traits of character. We esteem them highly, however, just because they have so much to do with results; they are, _par excellence_, executive traits. But we do not approve of the man's whole character in approving these traits. There is something the matter with the man in whom good traits are put to a bad use. It is not true in such cases that we approve the _agent_ but condemn his _acts_. We approve certain phases of conduct, and in so far regard the doer as praiseworthy; we condemn other features of acts, and in so far disapprove him.[120]