"Is there nothing, then," he asks,[126] "about a man which can be termed good or bad, when on such or such an occasion, he suffers himself to be governed by such and such a motive? Yes, certainly, his _disposition_. Now disposition is a kind of fictitious entity,[127] feigned for the convenience of discourse, in order to express what there is supposed to be _permanent_ in a man's frame of mind, where, on such or such an occasion, he has been influenced by such or such a motive, to engage in an act, which, as it appeared to him, was of such or such a tendency." He then goes on to say that disposition is good or bad according to its effects. "A man is said to be of a mischievous[128] disposition, when by the influence of no matter what motives, he is _presumed_ to be more apt to engage, or form intentions of engaging, in acts which are _apparently_ of a pernicious tendency than in such as are apparently of a beneficial tendency: of a meritorious or beneficent disposition in the opposite case."[129] And again: "It is evident that the nature of a man's disposition must depend upon the nature of the motives he is apt to be influenced by; in other words, upon the degree of his sensibility to the force of such and such motives. For his disposition is, as it were, the sum of his intentions.... Now, intentions, like everything else, are produced by the things that are their causes: _and the causes of intentions are motives_. If, on any occasion, a man forms either a good or a bad intention, it must be by the influence of some motive."[130]