In subsequent experience these results, mere by-products of the original volition, enter in. "Outer" and non-moral for the original act, they are within subsequent voluntary activity, because they influence desire and make foresight more accurate in detail and more extensive in range. This translation of consequences once wholly unforeseeable into consequences which have to be taken in account is at its maximum in the change of impulsive into intelligent action. But there is no act so intelligent that its actual consequences do not run beyond its foreseen ones, and thus necessitate a subsequent revision of intention. Thus the distinction of "inner" and "outer" is one involved in the _growth of character and conduct_. Only if character were not in process of change, only if conduct were a fixed because isolated thing, should we have that separation of the inner and the outer which underlies alike the Kantian and the utilitarian theories. In truth, there is no separation, but only a contrast of the different levels of desire and forethought of earlier and later activities. The great need of the moral agent is thus a character which will make him as open, as accessible as possible, to the recognition of the consequences of his behavior. LITERATURE On CONDUCT AND CHARACTER in general, see Paulsen, _System of Ethics_, pp. 468-472; Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_, Book I., ch. iii.; Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, Part I., chs. i.-viii.; Green, _Prolegomena to Ethics_, pp. 110-117, 152-159; Alexander, _Moral Order and Progress_, pp. 48-52; Stephen, _Science of Ethics_, ch. ii.; Mezes, _Ethics_, ch. iv.; Seth, _Ethical Principles_, ch. iii. Upon MOTIVE AND INTENTION consult Bentham, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, chs. viii. and x.; James Mill, _Analysis of Human Mind_, Vol. II., chs. xxii. and xxv.; Austin, _Jurisprudence_, Vol. I., chs. xviii.-xx.; Green, _Prolegomena_, pp. 315-325; Alexander, _Moral Order and Progress_, pp. 36-47; Westermarck, _Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_, chs. viii., xi., and xiii.; Ritchie, _International Journal of Ethics_, Vol. IV., pp. 89-94, and 229-238, where farther references are given. Upon FORMAL AND MATERIAL (or subjective and objective) RIGHTNESS see Sidgwick, _History of Ethics_, p. 200; Rickaby, _Moral Philosophy_, p. 3, pp. 33-40; Bowne, _Principles of Ethics_, pp. 39-40; Brown, _Philosophy of Mind_, Vol. III., p. 489 and pp. 499-500; Paulsen, _System of Ethics_, pp. 227-233; Green, _Prolegomena_, pp. 317-323; Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, pp. 206-207. FOOTNOTES: [120] When Kant says that the coolness of a villain makes him "more dangerous and more abominable," it is suggested that it is more abominable _because_ it is more dangerous--surely a statement of the value of will in terms of the results it tends to effect. [121] Kant's distinction between a mere wish, and "assuming all the means in our power," appears to recognize this fact, but he does not apply the fact in his theory.