[122] But, as we shall see, the utilitarians make finally a distinction between ends _achieved_ and ends _attempted_. [123] Bentham, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, ch. x., § 3. [124] Mill, _Utilitarianism_. [125] _Psychology_, Vol. II., pp. 562-563. The whole passage, pp. 561-569, should be thoroughly familiar to every ethical student; and should be compared with what is said in Vol. I., pp. 284-290, about the selective tendency of feelings; and Vol. I., ch. xi., upon attention, and Vol. I., pp. 515-522, upon discrimination. Höffding, _Psychology_ (translated), is also clear and explicit with reference to the influence of our emotions upon our ideas. (See especially pp. 298-307.) The development of this fact in some of its aspects is one of the chief traits of the Ethics of Spinoza. [126] _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, ch. xi., § 1. [127] Bentham does not mean "unreal" by a fictitious entity. According to his logic, all general and abstract terms, all words designating relations rather than elements, are "fictitious entities." [128] By mischievous he means pernicious, bad, vicious, or even depraved in extreme cases. [129] _Ibid._, ch. xi., § 3. [130] _Ibid._, §§ 27 and 28. [131] The fact that common moral experience, as embodied in common speech, uses such terms as "think of," "consider," "regard," "pay attention to" (in such expressions as he is thoughtful of, considerate of, regardful of, mindful of, attentive to, the interests of others) in a way implying both the action of intelligence and of the affections, is the exact counterpart of the interchangeable use, already mentioned, of the terms intention and motive. [132] In short, the way an individual favors himself in reading his own motives is as much an evidence of his egoism as the way he favors himself in outward action. Criminals can almost always assign "good" motives. [133] "Formally" and "materially" good or bad are terms also employed to denote the same distinction. (See Sidgwick, _History of Ethics_, pp. 199-200; so Bowne, _Principles of Ethics_, pp. 39-40.) "The familiar distinction between the formal and the material rightness of action: The former depends upon the attitude of the agent's will towards his ideal of right; the latter depends upon the harmony of the act with the laws of reality and its resulting tendency to produce and promote well-being." Bowne holds that both are necessary, while formal rightness is ethically _more_ important, though not all important. CHAPTER XIV HAPPINESS AND CONDUCT: THE GOOD AND DESIRE