=Recognition by an Opponent.=--The following remarks by T. H. Green are the more noteworthy because coming from a consistent opponent of the theory: "The chief theory of conduct which in Modern Europe has afforded the conscientious citizen a vantage ground for judging of the competing claims on his obedience, and enabled him to substitute a critical and intelligent for a blind and unquestioning conformity, has no doubt been the Utilitarian. ... Whatever the errors arising from its hedonistic psychology, no other theory has been available for the social or political reformer, combining so much truth with such ready applicability. No other has offered so commanding a point of view from which to criticize the precepts and institutions presented as authoritative."[140] And again, speaking of the possibility of practical service from theory, he says: "The form of philosophy which in the modern world has most conspicuously rendered this service has been the Utilitarian, because it has most definitely announced the interest of humanity without distinction of persons or classes, as the end by reference to which all claims upon obedience are ultimately to be measured.... Impartiality of reference to human well-being has been the great lesson which the Utilitarian has had to teach."[141] =Irreconcilable Conflict of Motive and End.=--But unfortunately the assertion that the happiness of all concerned is the "universally _desirable_ end," is mixed up by early utilitarianism with an hedonistic psychology, according to which the _desired_ object is private and personal pleasure. What is _desirable_ is thus so different from what is _desired_ as to create an uncrossable chasm between the true end of action--the happiness of all,--and the moving spring of desire and action--private pleasure. That there is a difference between what is _naturally_ desired (meaning by "naturally" what first arouses interest and excites endeavor) and what is morally desirable (understanding by this the consequences which present themselves in adequate deliberation), is certain enough. But the desirable must be _capable of becoming_ desired, or else there is such a contradiction that morality is impossible. If, now, the object of desire is always private pleasure, how can the recognition of the consequences upon the happiness or misery of others ever become an effective competitor with considerations of personal well-being, when the two conflict?[142]