=Sympathy as Actuating Principle of a Reasonable Judgment.=--We have had repeated occasion (as in the discussion of intent and motive, of intuition and deliberate calculation) to see how artificial is the separation of emotion and thought from one another. As the only effective thought is one fused by emotion into a dominant interest, so the only truly general, the reasonable as distinct from the merely shrewd or clever thought, is the _generous_ thought. Sympathy widens our interest in consequences and leads us to take into account such results as affect the welfare of others; it aids us to count and weigh these consequences as counting for as much as those which touch our own honor, purse, or power. To put ourselves in the place of another, to see from the standpoint of his purposes and values, to humble our estimate of our own claims and pretensions to the level they would assume in the eyes of a sympathetic and impartial observer, is the surest way to attain universality and objectivity of moral knowledge. Sympathy, in short, is the general principle of moral knowledge, not because its commands take precedence of others (which they do not necessarily), but because it furnishes the most reliable and efficacious _intellectual_ standpoint. It supplies the tool, _par excellence_, for analyzing and resolving complex cases. As was said in our last chapter, it is the _fusion_ of the sympathetic impulses with others that is needed; what we now add is that in this fusion, sympathy supplies the _pou sto_ for an effective, broad, and objective survey of desires, projects, resolves, and deeds. It translates the formal and empty reason of Kant out of its abstract and theoretic character, just as it carries the cold calculations of utilitarianism into recognition of the common good. LITERATURE For criticisms of Kant's view of reason, see Caird, _Philosophy of Kant_, Vol. II., Book II., ch. ii.; Paulsen, _System of Ethics_, pp. 194-203 and 355-363; Fite, _Introductory Study_, pp. 173-188; Muirhead, _Elements of Ethics_, pp. 112-124. For intuitionalism, see Calderwood, _Handbook of Moral Philosophy_; Maurice, _Conscience_; Whewell, _The Elements of Morality_; Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_, Vol. II., pp. 96-115; Mezes, _Ethics_, ch. iii.; Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, Book I., chs. viii.-ix., and Book III. entire, but especially ch. i.; _History of Ethics_, 170-204, and 224-236, and _Lectures on Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau_, 361-374. For the moral sense theory, see Sidgwick, _History of Ethics_, p. 189; Shaftesbury, _Characteristics_; Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_. For casuistry, see references in Rand's _Bibliography_, Vol. III., Part II., p. 880.