>>>>>Proof--When the mind conceives itself and its power of activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or adequate idea (II. xliii). But the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas (II. xl. note ii.). Therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it is active (III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.); therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire. >>>>>Proof--All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or pain, as their definitions, already given, show. Now by pain we mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked (III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind feels pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is diminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.) are attributable to the mind in that condition. Q.E.D. *****Note--All actions following from emotion, which are attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set down to "strength of character" ("fortitudo"), which I divide into "courage" ("animositas") and "highmindedness" ("generositas"). By "courage" I mean "the desire whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason." By "highmindedness" I mean "the desire whereby every man endeavours, solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to unite them to himself in friendship." Those actions, therefore, which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c., are varieties of highmindedness.