^^^^^Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly the essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say that love is "the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved object" expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and, as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence, they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by "wish" consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by "wish" I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained. VII. "Hatred" is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. ^^^^^Explanation--These observations are easily grasped after what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf. also III. xiii. note). VIII. "Inclination" is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure. IX. "Aversion" is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note). X. "Devotion" is love towards one whom we admire. ^^^^^Explanation--Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III. lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love. XI. "Derision" is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we hate. ^^^^^Explanation--In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent rejoice (III. xx.). But since we assume that man hates that which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note). XII. "Hope" is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue. XIII. "Fear" is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).