Note.- He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice. We may add, that he, who is easily touched with compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason. He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III: xxvii.) he seems unlike a man. Prop. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree therewith and arise therefrom. Proof.- Approval is love towards one who has done good to another (Def. of the Emotions:xix.); therefore it may be referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III:lix.), that is (III:iii.), in so far as it - understands; therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c. Q.E.D. Another Proof.- He, who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV:xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will feel pleasure (III:xi.Note) accompanied by the idea of the benefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D. Note.- Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions:xx.) is necessarily evil (IV:xlv.); we may, however, remark that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him. Prop. LII. Self-approval may arise from reason, and that which arises from reason is the highest possible. Proof.- Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the Emotions:xxv.). But a man's true power of action - or virtue is reason herself (III:iii.), as the said man clearly and distinctly contemplates her (II:xl., II:xliii.); therefore self-approval arises from reason. Again, when a man is contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action (III:Def.ii.), that is (III:iii.), from his power of understanding; therefore in such contemplation alone does the highest possible self-approval arise. Q.E.D.