The points to note concerning shame (pudor) may easily be inferred from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not mortified. Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no desire to live honourably. Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good or evil emotions. But all, in so far as they are engendered in us by, emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is evident from what was said in IV:xliv.Note), and would be useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance of reason only, as I will now briefly, show. Prop. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined without emotion by reason. Proof.- To act rationally, is nothing else (III:iii. and III:Def.ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the necessity, of our nature {to persist} considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action (IV:xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance of reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV:xli., IV:xliii.); therefore to this extent we could not be determined by, it to any action, which we could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly, pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions (III:iii., &Note). Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions:iv. explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions:i.) is nothing else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c. Q.E.D.