The striking of this snag, which affected vitally the political balance
of power in the Near East and the economic interests of the Entente
Powers, caused the conference to waste weeks in futile discussion. A
recess was taken for Christmas, in the hope that the Turks might be
willing to compromise. The Entente experts went ahead with the work
of drafting the treaty. But on January 3, 1923, Reouf Bey, Chief of
Commissars of the Angora Government, told the National Assembly that
the full powers of the Turkish delegation at Lausanne had been given to
conclude peace, but with the following reservations:
(1) Karagach is inseparable from Adrianople.
(2) A plebiscite is demanded for Western Thrace.
(3) Turkey cannot recognize any Armenian State outside the Armenian
Republic in the Caucasus, whose capital is Erivan.
(4) Before conceding freedom of the Straits, Turkey must obtain
full guarantees in regard to the security of the Sea of Marmora and
Constantinople.
(5) Turkey refuses to accept any foreign control on Turkish
territory.
(6) Mosul is within the limits of Turkey as outlined in the
National Pact, because the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants
are the sons of Turkey.
(7) If Turkey cannot obtain a war indemnity or reparations at
Lausanne, she must be allowed to settle this matter with the Greeks
alone.
(8) In the question of the capitulations, Turkey will remain true
to the National Pact, by which they are abrogated.
(9) Yemen is a part of our country, and the Hedjaz Railway is the
property of the Evkaf (Religious Foundations).
The British and French could not for a time believe that the Turks were
in earnest. It was preposterous to suppose that the British would give
up the Mosul region, rich in oil, which had been the underlying motive
of the stupendous sacrifices they made to conquer and hold Mesopotamia.
The Yemen is a province of Arabia, and the claim to it and to a
proprietary right in the Hedjaz Railway was a challenge to the British
and French mandates. A plebiscite for Western Thrace and Turkish
claims for indemnity against Greece might easily lead to a new Balkan
war, with unlimited possibilities; for the Little Entente was already
showing itself restless over the failure of the Big Entente delegates
to maintain the attitude they had adopted at Mudania, where a strict
limitation of the forces Turkey was to be allowed in Thrace had been
insisted upon. The most alarming of all the claims of the Turks was
their assertion of the right to abrogate the capitulations.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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