Neither Bonar Law nor Mussolini, however, felt that it would be good policy to ignore the German offer. Had not France and Belgium been showing a tendency, which had to be checked, to regard reparations from Germany as a matter interesting themselves exclusively? The British and Italian replies both pronounced the offer as “far from corresponding, either in form or in substance, to what might reasonably have been expected,” as Lord Curzon put it. The British answer called attention to the fact that the British program, which was rejected by the other Entente Powers in January, had provided for nearly double the amount Germany now offered. How could Germany expect that 30,000,000,000 gold marks would be accepted as a basis for discussion? The Italian answer declared that Germany failed to realize the importance of taking into account Italian reparation claims. These had been reduced to one tenth of the amount to be recovered from Germany on the ground that Italy was to receive compensation from Austria and Hungary, which had not been forthcoming. Both Governments omitted any reference to the Ruhr, or to Germany’s alternate proposal to refer the reparations question to an international tribunal. One point in the Italian note was significant. It laid stress on the intimate connection between reparations and interallied war debts and insisted that this problem be solved at the earliest possible moment in order to “relieve the cost of reconstruction of the Italian invaded provinces.” The sacrifice demanded of Italy by Germany was therefore too great. The Paris “Temps,” commenting on the British and Italian notes, said that Great Britain and Italy, by encouraging the Germans in their passive resistance, must be held partly responsible for the inadequacy of the German proposition. Great Britain, declared the “Temps,” had to realize that “the amount France and Italy demand from Germany will necessarily depend upon the sums claimed from them by England.” Virtually every other Paris newspaper said in substance the same thing. By the middle of May it had become clear that if the deadlock was to be broken, and a tolerable sum fixed for German reparations, pressure in the Ruhr was not going to accomplish that purpose. Hope lay in a reconsideration of interallied indebtedness; and a part of the sacrifices to be made would be demanded of Great Britain and the United States.