We cannot do better, in bringing this long criticism of the Darwinian theory to an end, than by considering the way in which Weismann has attempted in his paper on “Germinal Selection” to solve one of the “patent contradictions” of the selection theory. He calls attention, in doing so, to what he regards as a vital weakness of the theory in the form in which it was left by Darwin himself. Weismann says:— “The basal idea of the essay—the existence of Germinal Selection—was propounded by me some time since,[15] but it is here for the first time fully set forth and tentatively shown to be the necessary complement of the process of selection. Knowing this factor, we remove, it seems to me, the patent contradiction of the assumption that the general fitness of organisms, or the adaptations _necessary_ to their existence, are produced by _accidental_ variations—a contradiction which formed a serious stumbling-block to the theory of selection. Though still assuming that the _primary_ variations are ‘accidental,’ I yet hope to have demonstrated that an interior mechanism exists which compels them to go on increasing in a definite direction, the moment selection intervenes. _Definitely directed variation exists_, but not predestined variation, running on independently of the life conditions of the organism, as Nägeli, to mention the most extreme advocate of this doctrine, has assumed; on the contrary, the variation is such as is elicited and controlled by those conditions themselves, though indirectly.” Footnote 15: _Neue Gedanken zur Vererbungsfrage, eine Antwort an Herbert Spencer_, Jena, 1895. “The real aim of the present essay is to rehabilitate the principle of selection. If I should succeed in reinstating this principle in its emperilled rights, it would be a source of extreme satisfaction to me; for I am so thoroughly convinced of its indispensability as to believe that its demolition would be synonymous with the renunciation of all inquiry concerning the causal relation of vital phenomena. If we could understand the adaptations of nature, whose number is infinite, only upon the assumption of a teleological principle, then, I think, there would be little inducement to trouble ourselves about the causal connection of the stages of ontogenesis, for no good reason would exist for excluding teleological principles from this field. Their introduction, however, is the ruin of science.”[16] Footnote 16: Translated by J. McCormack. The Open Court Publishing Company. The following quotations are also taken from this translation.