The Tabah incident -- The Dardanelles memorandum of 1906 -- Special steps taken with regard to it by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman -- Mr. Churchill first raises the question -- My conference with him in October 1914 -- The naval project against the Straits -- Its fundamental errors -- Would never have been carried into effect had there been a conference between the Naval War Staff and the General Staff -- The bad start -- The causes of the final failure on the 18th of March -- Lord K.'s instructions to Sir I. Hamilton -- The question of the packing of the transports -- Sir I. Hamilton's complaint as to there being no plan prepared -- The 1906 memorandum -- Sir Ian's complaint about insufficient information -- How the 1906 memorandum affected this question -- Misunderstanding as to the difficulty of obtaining information -- The information not in reality so defective -- My anxiety at the time of the first landing -- The plan, a failure by early in May -- Impossibility of sending reinforcements then -- Question whether the delay in sending out reinforcements greatly affected the result in August 1915 -- The Dardanelles Committee -- Its anxiety -- Sir E. Carson and Mr. Churchill, allies -- The question of clearing out -- My disinclination to accept the principle before September -- Sir C. Monro sent out -- The delay of the Government in deciding -- Lord K. proceeds to the Aegean -- My own experiences -- A trip to Paris with a special message to the French Government -- Sent on a fool's errand, thanks to the Cabinet -- A notable State paper on the subject -- Mr. Lloyd George and the "sanhedrin" -- Decision to evacuate only Anzac and Suvla -- Sir W. Robertson arrives and orders sent to evacuate Helles -- I give up the appointment of D.M.O. CHAPTER VI SOME EXPERIENCES IN THE WAR OFFICE...................... 107