Explanation of Catholic Morals: A Concise, Reasoned, and Popular Exposition of Catholic MoralsStapleton, John H. (John Henry)
Religion
Explanation of Catholic Morals: A Concise, Reasoned, and Popular Exposition of Catholic Morals
Stapleton, John H. (John Henry)
Christian ethics -- Catholic authors
TO lie is to utter an untruth, with full knowledge that it is an
untruth. The untruth may be expressed by any conventional sign, by
word, deed, gesture, or even by silence. Its malice and disorder
consists in the opposition that exists between our idea and the
expression we give to it; our words convey a meaning contrary to what
is in our mind; we say one thing and mean another. If we unwittingly
utter what is contrary to fact, that is error; if we so clumsily
translate our thoughts as to give a false impression of what we mean,
and we do the best we can, that is a blunder; if in a moment of
listlessness and inattention we speak in a manner that conflicts with
our state of mind, that is temporary mental aberration. But if we
knowingly give out as truth what we know is not the truth, we lie
purely and simply.
In misrepresentations of this kind it is not required that there be a
plainly formulated purpose of deceiving another; an implicit intention,
a disposition to allow our words to run their natural course, is
sufficient to give such utterances a character of mendacity. For,
independently of our mental attitude, it is in the nature of a lie to
deceive; an intention, or rather a pretense to the contrary, does not
affect that nature. The fact of lying presupposes that we intend in
some manner to practise deception; if we did not have such a purpose we
would not resort to lying. If you stick a knife into a man, you may
pretend what you like, but you did certainly intend to hurt him and
make him feel badly.
Nor has any ulterior motive we may have in telling an untruth the power
to change its nature; a lie is a lie, no matter what prompted it.
Whether it serves the purpose of amusement, as a jocose lie; or helps
to gain us an advantage or get us out of trouble, as an officious lie;
or injures another in any way, as a pernicious lie: mendacity is the
character of our utterances, the guilt of willful falsehood is on our
soul. A restriction should, however, be made in favor of the jocose
lie; it ceases to be a lie when the mind of the speaker is open to all
who listen and his narration or statement may be likened to those
fables and myths and fairy tales in which is exemplified the charm of
figurative language. When a person says what is false and is convinced
that all who hear him know it is false, the contradiction between his
mind and its expression is said to be material, and not formal; and in
this the essence of a lie does not consist.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account