It has also been objected that the attempt to secure the _assignats_ on government real estate failed because of the general want of confidence in the title derived by the purchasers from the new government. Every thorough student of that period must know that this is a misleading statement. Everything shows that the vast majority of the French people had a fanatical confidence in the stability of the new government during the greater part of the Revolution. There were disbelievers in the security of the _assignats_ just as there were disbelievers in the paper money of the United States throughout our Civil War; but they were usually a small minority. Even granting that there was a doubt as to investment in French lands, the French people certainly had as much confidence in the secure possession of government lands as any people can ever have in large issues of government bonds: indeed, it is certain that they had far more confidence in their lands as a security than modern nations can usually have in large issues of bonds obtained by payments of irredeemable paper. One simple fact, as stated by John Stuart Mill, which made _assignats_ difficult to convert into real estate was that the vast majority of people could not afford to make investments outside their business; and this fact is no less fatal to any attempt to contract large issues of irredeemable paper--save, perhaps, a bold, statesmanlike attempt, which seizes the best time and presses every advantage, eschewing all juggling devices and sacrificing everything to maintain a sound currency based on standards common to the entire financial world. And now was seen, taking possession of the nation, that idea which developed so easily out of the fiat money system;--the idea that the ordinary needs of government may be legitimately met wholly by the means of paper currency;--that taxes may be dispensed with. As a result, it was found that the _assignat_ printing press was the one resource left to the government, and the increase in the volume of paper money became every day more appalling. It will doubtless surprise many to learn that, in spite of these evident results of too much currency, the old cry of a "scarcity of circulating medium" was not stilled; it appeared not long after each issue, no matter how large. But every thoughtful student of financial history knows that this cry always comes after such issues--nay, that it _must_ come,--because in obedience to a natural law, the former scarcity, or rather _insufficiency_ of currency recurs just as soon as prices become adjusted to the new volume, and there comes some little revival of business with the usual increase of credit. [56]