Many speculators lose because the information on which they base their operations is _insufficient_; more because it is _false_; and others because, while their information is correct, they do _not know how to turn it to account_. Between one or other of these difficulties in the use of information must be distributed a very large proportion of the losses incurred in speculation. Incomplete or insufficient information is especially dangerous. One-sided knowledge is nowhere so deceiving as here. A railroad, for instance, may report an increase of gross earnings which is construed as making its stock worth two or three per cent. more than its current price; but the improvement may be due to transient special causes, and the road’s current expenses may be growing at a rate which makes the net increase show a decrease. A financially embarrassed company may announce an assessment of its stockholders, upon which there is a rush to sell the stock; a little further explanation shows that the proceeds of the assessment will so improve the facilities of the company, or so enable it to reduce its fixed charges, as to make the stock intrinsically far more valuable than it was before; this discovery causes a sharp advance in the shares, and the “short” sellers have to cover their sales at a loss. A stock is bought up freely at New York because London is taking large amounts of it; a day or two later, the deliveries show that large holders connected with the management are unloading on the foreign market upon knowledge of facts damaging to the prospects of the property; the late buyers then rush to realize, and pocket a loss instead of a profit. Every day furnishes new instances of speculations undertaken on this incomplete kind of information, and which end disastrously because the operators did not wait to be informed on all sides of the case, but were satisfied to take a pound of assumption with but an ounce of fact.