First notions of logic (preparatory to the study of geometry)De Morgan, Augustus
Philosophy
First notions of logic (preparatory to the study of geometry)
De Morgan, Augustus
Logic
6. If one premiss be particular, the conclusion must be particular. This
is not very obvious, since the middle term may be universally spoken of
in a particular proposition, as in Some B is not X. But this requires
one negative proposition, whence (Rule 3) the other must be affirmative.
Again, since the conclusion must be negative (Rule 5) its predicate is
spoken of universally, and, therefore, must enter universally; the other
term A must enter, then, in a universal affirmative proposition, which
is against the supposition.
In the preceding set of syllogisms we observe one form only which
produces A, or E, or I, but three which produce O.
Let an assertion be said to be weakened when it is reduced from
universal to particular, and strengthened in the contrary case. Thus,
‘Every A is B’ is called stronger than ‘Some A is B.’
Every form of syllogism which can give a legitimate result is either one
of the preceding six, or another formed from one of the six, either by
changing one of the assertions into its converse, if that be allowable,
or by strengthening one of the premises without altering the conclusion,
or both. Thus,
Some A is X may be written Some X is A
Every X is B „ Every X is B
What follows will still follow from _Every_ X is A
„ Every X is B
for all which is true when ‘Some X is A,’ is not less true when ‘Every X
is A.’
It would be possible also to form a legitimate syllogism by weakening
the conclusion, when it is universal, since that which is true of all is
true of some. Thus, ‘Every A is X, Every X is B,’ which yields ‘Every A
is B,’ also yields ‘Some A is B.’ But writers on logic have always
considered these syllogisms as useless, conceiving it better to draw
from any premises their strongest conclusion. In this they were
undoubtedly right; and the only question is, whether it would not have
been advisable to make the premises as weak as possible, and not to
admit any syllogisms in which more appeared than was absolutely
necessary to the conclusion. If such had been the practice, then
Every X is A, Every X is B, therefore Some A is B
would have been considered as formed by a spurious and unnecessary
excess of assertion. The minimum of assertion would be contained in
either of the following,
Every X is A, Some X is B, therefore Some A is B
Some X is A, Every X is B, therefore Some A is B
In this tract, syllogisms have been divided into two classes: first,
those which prove a universal conclusion; secondly, those which prove a
partial conclusion, and which are (all but one) derived from the first
by weakening one of the premises, in such manner as to produce a
legitimate but weakened conclusion. Those of the first class are placed
in the first column, and the other in the second.
Universal. Particular.
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