First notions of logic (preparatory to the study of geometry)De Morgan, Augustus
Philosophy
First notions of logic (preparatory to the study of geometry)
De Morgan, Augustus
Logic
Now, it is a fundamental and self-evident proposition, that no
consequence must be allowed to assert more widely than its premises; so
that, for instance, an assertion which is only of some Bs can never lead
to a result which is true of all Bs. But if a proposition assert
agreement or disagreement, any other proposition which asserts the same,
to the same extent and no further, must be a legitimate consequence; or,
if you please, must amount to the whole, or part, of the original
assertion in another form. Thus, the converse of A is not true: for, in
‘Every A is B,’ the predicate enters partially; while in ‘Every B is A,’
the subject enters wholly. ‘All the As make up a part of the Bs, then a
part of the Bs are among the As, or some B is A.’ Hence, the only
_legitimate_ converse of ‘Every A is B’ is, ‘Some B is A.’ But in ‘No A
is B,’ both subject and predicate enter wholly, and ‘No B is A’ is, in
fact, the same proposition as ‘No A is B.’ And ‘Some A is B’ is also the
same as its converse ‘Some B is A;’ here both terms enter partially. But
‘Some A is not B’ admits of no converse whatever; it is perfectly
consistent with all assertions upon B and A in which B is the subject.
Thus neither of the four following lines is inconsistent with itself.
Some A is not B and Every B is A
Some A is not B and No B is A
Some A is not B and Some B is A
Some A is not B and Some B is not A.
We find then, including converses, which are not identical with their
direct propositions, _six_ different ways of asserting or denying, with
respect to agreement or non-agreement, total or partial, between A and,
say X: these we write down, designating the additional assertions by U
and Y.
│Identical. │ Identical. │
A Every A is X│E No A is X│I Some A is X│O Some A is not X
U Every X is A│„ No X is A│„ Some X is A│Y Some X is not A
We shall now repeat and extend the table of page 8 (A), &c., meaning, as
before, the denial of A, &c.
From A or (O) follow A, (E), I (O)
From E or (I) (A), E, (I), O, (U), Y
From I or (E) (E) I
From O or (A) (A), O
From U or (Y) (E) I, U (Y)
From Y or (U) (U) Y
Having thus discussed the principal points connected with the simple
assertion, we pass to the manner of making two assertions give a third.
Every instance of this is called a syllogism, the two assertions which
form the basis of the third are called premises, and the third itself
the conclusion.
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