In 1860 Mr. Holt, the postmaster-general, by virtue of the act of March 3, 1851, by a formal order declared all the streets, lanes, avenues, &c. within the corporate limits of the cities of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, to be post-roads, and notified all engaged in the transportation and delivery of letters for compensation in said cities, that they would expose themselves to the penalties imposed by the third section of the act of March, 1827. The private expresses in the cities named acquiesced in the legality of the step, with the exception of one in Philadelphia long and familiarly known as “Blood’s Express,” and subsequently, “Despatch.” In despite of the act of 1851, or the penalty imposed under that of 1827, Blood’s Express continued its regular delivery of letters in defiance of the department. A bill in equity was filed with a view of restraining the company from this habitual and persistent violation of the postal laws; but, upon full argument and consideration had on the questions involved, the injunction was denied. The mere existence of a postal department of the government is not an establishment of monopoly. No government has ever organized a system of posts without securing to itself a monopoly of the carriage of letters and mailable matter; but this was never intended to control individual enterprise in the express line. Judge Grier, who indorses the decision of this case, says,[58] “The business of private carriers of letters and mailable packets, even on principal mail-routes, is lawful unless legislatively prohibited. A private monopoly, secured by prohibitory legislation, cannot require the suppression of a rival business of competitors who do not infringe the prohibition, merely because the continuance of their business would lessen or destroy the profits of his monopoly. A like rule applies in determining the effect of a government’s legislative prohibitions to secure its own postal monopoly. The monopoly cannot be extended beyond the legislative prohibitions, merely because the continuance of a specific business which has not been prohibited would reduce the postal earnings of the government, or even frustrate the purposes of its exclusive policy.” Streets, lanes, alleys, and avenues were not, in the opinion of the judge, “post-routes.” Public streets intersecting a municipal town are as highways distinguishable specifically from the general public highways of a State beyond the town limits. The streets are, indeed, as thoroughfares, general public highways of the State; but, independently of this character of thoroughfares, the streets are specially _local highways_ of the town. Internal affairs of municipal towns affecting their local interests alone are always regulated more or less by their local governments. So far as these streets over which the mail may be carried are entitled to be termed “post-roads for the passage of the mail,” there is no