Had the British troops been beaten, the inhabitants of the Logan valley were prepared to rise, to a man. The Ghilzais and other hill tribes would have swept down upon the line of retreat; and few, if any, of the British force would have returned to tell the tale. The next day Baker's division had the post of honor, and made a short march to Chaurasia. Beyond this village, the enemy had taken up their position. Three miles beyond the village the valley ends--a mass of hills shutting it in, with only a narrow defile leading, through them, to the plain of Cabul beyond. Upon both sides of the defile the enemy had placed guns in position, and lined the whole circle of the hills commanding the approach to it. Mountaineers from their birth, they believed that--although the British infantry might possess a superiority in the plain--they could be no match for them on the steep hillside; and they no doubt thought that no attempt would be made to storm so strong a position, but that the British column would march straight up the valley into the defile, where they would be helplessly slaughtered by the guns and matchlock men on the heights. Judging from their own tactics, they had reason for the belief that their position was an impregnable one. In their hill fights the Afghans never come to close quarters. Posted behind rocks and huge boulders, the opposing sides keep up a distant musketry duel--lasting, sometimes, for days--until one side or the other becomes disheartened with its losses, or has exhausted its ammunition. Then it falls back, and the other claims the victory. The idea that English soldiers would, under a heavy fire from their concealed force, steadily climb up the broken mountainside, and come to close quarters, probably never entered into their calculations. At daybreak on the 6th, a working party were sent forward to improve the road towards the defile. But they had scarcely started when the cavalry patrol in advance rode in, and announced that the enemy were in great strength on the hills, and had guns in position to command the road. General Roberts had now a choice of two courses--he could either attack the whole Afghan force, with the one division at hand; or he could wait until joined by Macpherson's brigade, next morning. The feat of carrying such a position in face of an immensely superior force, with only half of his little command, was a very serious one but, upon the other hand, every hour added to the number of hillmen who swarmed upon the flanks of the army, just beyond musket range. A delay of twenty-four hours would bring the whole fighting force of the tribesmen into the valley and, while attacking the enemy's position in the front, he would be liable to an assault upon his rear, by them.