Confident in the valor of his soldiers, he chose the first alternative and, at eleven o'clock, his little force marched out from the camp to attack the Afghan army. By this time the enemy's position had been reconnoitered, and it was found to be too strong for a direct attack. It was therefore resolved to ascend the hills on both flanks, and so to drive their defenders back beyond the defile. This, in any case, would have been the best mode of assault; but against semi-savage enemies, flank attacks are peculiarly effective. Having prepared for an assault in one direction, they are disconcerted and disheartened by finding themselves attacked in a different manner; and the fear of a flank being turned, and the line of retreat thereby menaced, will generally suffice to cause a rapid retreat. General Baker, himself, took the command of the left attack. His force consisted of four guns of Number 2 Mountain Battery, two Gatling guns, the 7th company of Sappers and Miners, a wing of the 72nd Highlanders, six companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, 200 men of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, and 450 of the 23rd Pioneers. This was the main column of attack. The right column--under the command of Major White, of the 72nd Highlanders--consisted of a wing of that regiment, 100 men of the 23rd Pioneers, three guns of the Royal Artillery, and two squadrons of cavalry. This attack was intended only as a feint, and to distract the attention of the Afghans from the main attack. A strong reserve was left in Chaurasia, to guard the baggage and to overawe the tribesmen. As General Baker's column reached the foot of the hills, the 23rd--who led the advance, thrown out in skirmishing line--began to climb the ascent. The enemy were armed with Sniders and Enfields, and their fire was rapid and continuous; fortunately it was by no means accurate, and our losses were small. The Afghans, in their hill fighting, are accustomed to fire very slowly and deliberately--taking steady aim, with their guns resting on the rocks--and, so fighting, they are excellent shots. It is probable, however, that the steady advance of our men towards them flurried and disconcerted them; and that they thought more of firing quickly, than of taking a correct aim. The 72nd, pressing up the hill, were assisted by the fire of the mountain guns and Gatlings, and by that of the Punjaubees in their rear. Gradually the upper slopes of the hills were gained; and the British troops, pressing forward, drove the Afghans back along the crest. Several times they made obstinate stands, holding their ground until the 72nd were close to them.