On the northwest shore of Tybee Island facing Fort Pulaski these troops erected 11 batteries for guns and mortars. Their job was made particularly difficult because the last mile of the shore, on which seven of the major batteries had to be established, was an open marsh in full view of the fort and within effective range of its guns. Here all work was performed at night. The men were not allowed to speak above a whisper and were guided by the notes of a whistle. Before dawn each morning evidence of the night’s work was concealed by camouflage. When the batteries were ready, the guns were hauled across the marsh on sling carts. These loads were so extraordinarily heavy that it was often necessary to harness 250 men to a cart. Even on the last night before the bombardment the work continued. In the flickering light of lanterns men filled cartridge bags, cut paper fuses, and whittled wooden fuse plugs. [Illustration: _Guns were hauled by manpower._ From _Harper’s Pictorial History of the War of 1861_.] The final armament comprised 36 pieces placed at various distances from the fort as shown in the following table: 1. Battery, Stanton, 3 heavy 13-inch Mortars, at 3,400 yds 2. “ Grant, 3 heavy 13-inch Mortars, “ 3,200 “ 3. “ Lyon, 3 heavy 10-inch Columbiads, “ 3,100 “ 4. “ Lincoln, 3 heavy 8-inch Columbiads, “ 3,045 “ 5. “ Burnside, 1 heavy 13-inch Mortar, “ 2,750 “ 6. “ Sherman, 3 heavy 13-inch Mortar, “ 2,650 “ 7. “ Halleck, 2 heavy 13-inch Mortar, “ 2,400 “ 8. “ Scott, 3 10-in. Columbiads, } “ 1,740 “ Scott, 1 8-in. Columbiads, } 9. “ Sigel, 5 30-pdr. Parrott, } “ 1,670 “ Sigel, 1 48-pdr. James, (old 24 pdr.) } 10. “ McClellan, 2 84-pdr. James, (old 42 pdr.) } “ 1,650 “ McClennan, 2 64-pdr. James, (old 32 pdr.) } 11. “ Totten 2 10-inch Siege Mortars, “ 1,650 “ _Eve of Battle_ On March 31, when preparations for the bombardment were almost complete, General Sherman was relieved of his command, and responsibility for the campaign in the Department of the South was turned over to Maj. Gen. David Hunter. While this move undoubtedly led to greater harmony of action between Army and Navy leaders, Sherman deserves much of the credit for the successful operations against Pulaski. Neither General Hunter nor Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benham, whom he had placed in command of the Northern District of the Department, suggested a single change in the siege works under construction on Tybee, and Gillmore was retained to conduct the bombardment. On the afternoon of April 9, everything was in readiness to open fire. General orders were issued, the Navy alerted, and the battle set for the following morning.