In course of time, however, a most formidable difficulty arises. Clerical education may be morally most beneficial, but it can only be so whilst the pupil himself is a sincere believer. If he is not, the effect of clerical education is not moral, but the contrary, as it compels him to learn the arts of dissimulation. The clergy do not say in plain terms that deceit and imposture are virtues; they class them, nominally, in the category of vices, but the intelligent pupil soon perceives that he is rewarded for practising them and punished for not practising them. “Many unbelievers,” said a truthful Frenchman to me, “come out of our clerical seminaries, but the acquired habit of dissimulation remains with them, and they are never plain and straightforward in after life.” Perhaps it may be said that I attach too much importance to truthfulness, that a certain degree of dissimulation is necessary in the world, and that it may as well be learned at school as in practical affairs. I only know that truthfulness is one of the social virtues, though it is often directly contrary to the interests of those who practise it. Being a social virtue, and favourable to public interests, it ought to be encouraged in public education. Now, it so happens, whether for good or evil, that the majority of French laymen of the educated classes are unbelievers, and I say that no moral purpose can be answered by bringing them up in habits of hypocrisy. I am told by those who are in a position to judge accurately, that is to say, by intelligent men who have lived all their lives in the University, that four out of every six professors are Agnostics, and that the proportion amongst the present generation of their pupils is even larger. Under these circumstances the idea of handing over the national University to the priests is inadmissible by any one who cares for liberty of conscience; and if the reader thinks that liberty of conscience is a luxury for Protestants only, and that Agnostics have no right to it, I cannot agree with him. [Sidenote: Liberty of Thought unfavourable to Moral Authority.] [Sidenote: Incompatibility of Authority with Reasoning.] [Sidenote: Principle of the Church of Rome.] Unfortunately, however, it is found in practice that liberty of thought in religious matters not being itself founded upon authority, but on the exercise of individual reason, is unfavourable to moral authority, especially over the young. In fact, reason and authority are incompatible. We rule our children by authority when they are young, without stopping to reason; when they are grown up we endeavour to influence them by reason, but our authority, as such, has departed. The Church of Rome avoids this difficulty by founding all her teaching on authority. Even when she condescends to reason, every one knows that the principle of authority is behind and can be used, like a royal prerogative, to cut short discussion at any moment.