The baby’s “feeble strength” is to be drawn into the game, where possible, “particularly that he may experience and perceive, directly through and in his own activity” (durch und in Eigenthätigkeit unmittelbar selbst erfahre und wahrnehme).--_P., p. 78._ It is “through spontaneous activity, as well as through the mother’s instinctive knowledge of his needs” that the child gains “the first impressions of the soul, as it were, the first cognitions.” Out of forty-nine Mother Songs, two only deal specifically with the senses, though all deal with action, and Froebel takes care to point out the close connection of sense and movement. “Limbs and senses seem to have very different provinces of activity, and so they have; yet so deep-seated is their linked interchange that neither of them fails to react on the other. And no Games for the limbs have presented themselves to us, not even the ‘Kicking Song’ which have not also made demands upon the sense of sight.”--_M., p. 168._ “The use of the body and of the limbs is developed simultaneously and in the same proportion as the use of the senses, the order being determined by their own nature and the properties of the material world. Outer objects are near, or moving away, or fixed at a distance, and either invite rest, seizure and holding fast, or invite him who would bring them nearer to move towards them.”--_E., p. 47._ Froebel’s account of the significance of the ceaseless activity of the young child anticipates to a certain extent that of Mr. Irving King, who, in his most interesting “Psychology of Child Development,” deals expressly with “the functional relation of consciousness to activity.” But the views of Professor Stout as expressed in his “Analytic Psychology,” and with which Froebel’s writing has already been compared, and those of Mr. Irving King do not appear to clash in any way. Mr. King begins by discussing the “sort of consciousness” a young child must have, and concludes that it must from the very first be a unified consciousness, however vague, any discreteness being on the part of the object. He also states that the consciousness of a human being must differ from that of the animal entering life with many “ready-made complexes of adjustment,” because “Consciousness is related not to activity, but to the growth of activity.” We have just seen that Froebel too insists on a unified consciousness, that he too says that “the external world,” though composed always of the same variety of objects, “comes to the child as ‘an undifferentiated unity.’” Froebel is also quite sound as to the difference between the mental possibilities of the animal “whose instincts, as they are called, are at birth so definite and strong,” and that of the child “born in the extreme condition of helplessness,” by whom “everything external is to be overcome.”[22]