the invasion and to take the offensive, and that Field-Marshal Oyama’s purpose was to surround his enemy and to add capture to defeat. In achievement both fell short of their designs. Chapter XXX KUROKI CROSSES THE TAI-TSU. The part assigned to General Kuroki in the attack on Liao-yang was worthy of his brilliant record. For five months his army had marched and fought in the mountains, driving back the enemy to his base and suffering not a single reverse. Our position was often hazardous, and since the attack on Mou-tien-ling in July we had confronted a superior force. We had to feed one hundred thousand men--including non-combatants and coolies--and were dependent on a line of communications always difficult, always vulnerable, and, in the rainy season, always precarious. Yet only for a few days at Lien-chen-kwan, when the rivers were in flood, were the soldiers reduced to short rations, and never once were our communications seriously threatened. At no time were we in a position to avoid an engagement had the Russians cared to attack. Retreat in such a country would have meant disaster. General Kuroki staked all on the chance of victory. I have described in some detail the movements of the First Army from August 25th, when the energies of the Japanese were bent on bringing into united action the armies of the West, the South, and the East, and on completing their strategy by leaving General Kuropatkin no choice but to accept a decisive battle that under conditions that would involve the capture of a large part of his defeated army. Driven back along the railway, the Russian leader showed a disposition to stand at Anshantien where he had a strong and well fortified position. But his ability to hold that position rested on his power to check, if not to repel, the advance of General Kuroki on his left flank. Once the Japanese penetrated the line of defence on the Tang-ho, they could menace the rear of the enemy’s position and Anshantien must be evacuated. To protect himself against this danger, General Kuropatkin detached a considerable force to oppose General Kuroki, and was evidently satisfied that he could hold the line of the river Tang while his main body engaged and defeated the inferior force marching on Anshantien. We have seen how this plan was brought to naught by the rapidity and success of General Kuroki’s operations after leaving Tien-tshu-tien on August 25th, and how three days later the Russians, outflanked on their left near Am-ping, became uneasy about their base and withdrew to their last defensive line in front of Liao-yang.