On August 29th--the enemy having withdrawn from Anshantien on the previous day--General Kuroki prepared to cross the Tai-tsu. His orders were to threaten the enemy’s flank and to strike at the railway. Such a manœuvre, if successful, must have turned defeat into disaster, and the mere threat of it was likely to disconcert the enemy and arrest any offensive measures he might be contemplating. But in order to gain the point aimed at it was necessary to deceive the Russians and to act with the utmost rapidity: while to ensure the destruction of their direct line of retreat a strong force was imperatively demanded. Every one of these conditions was absent. The enemy knew the hour and the place of our passage over the Tai-tsu: our attack was delayed for two days, and General Kuroki’s force was not more than one and a half divisions. The Guards were in difficulties and the Unizawa brigade was watching the flank near Ponchiho, which was threatened by a considerable force of the enemy. There remained only the Twelfth Division and a brigade of the Second Division. The river is broad and deep, and on the North bank are mountain ranges and isolated hills, beyond which lie the plain and the railway to Mukden. Having driven back a small party of observation, the Twelfth Division forded the stream near Kuanton at eleven o’clock on the night of the 30th and proceeded to occupy the hills East of that place. Half the Second division crossed over at the same ford and took up a position to cover their comrades in case of attack. Next day the artillery passed over by a pontoon bridge masked by a rocky escarpment out of range of the enemy’s guns. The crossing was made without difficulty or opposition. General Kuroki was fighting with his back to the river and in front of him was an overwhelming force of the enemy.