The duty assigned to General Kuroki’s army was to march North as quickly as possible, to discover the enemy and to give him battle. With Pyng-yang in his possession, the task was less difficult than it had appeared at the beginning of February. But many obstacles had to be overcome and many problems solved before the army could advance with safety and a definite purpose. Having no certain knowledge of the strength and intentions of the enemy, General Kuroki had to make plans for every contingency. He was aware that the Russians were entrenched on the North bank of the Yalu, yet he was by no means sure that they would not oppose him somewhere South of the river. General Michtchenko’s movements darkened the councils of the Japanese who were disposed to ascribe to them an intelligent purpose. When the Russian leader came to Syen-chen in a four-wheeled carriage he had with him 2,500 Cossacks and one battery of Field Artillery. With this force he occupied Anju, an important town on the Mandarin road, about thirty miles North of Pyng-yang. His next step was to send Korean spies to discover the movements of the enemy. Now the Korean looked upon the Russian as an unwelcome guest who occupied his house, ate his food, frightened away his women, and left him at the mercy of agents and interpreters to whose dirty palms stuck the roubles paid in compensation. His one ambition was to get rid of these visitors. Spies accordingly returned with reports that the Japanese were coming in great force from three directions. These stories had the effect they were intended to produce, and the Cossacks retired North with artillery and transport, destroying the telegraph wires and encouraging the natives to use the poles for fuel. The constitution of General Michtchenko’s force was another cause of perplexity. It was not easy to understand why a cavalry brigade should come as far South as Syen-chen into difficult mountainous country. If the object was to delay the advance of the Japanese, the cavalry would have been accompanied by a considerable force of infantry. On the other hand, if the purpose was merely to discover as quickly as possible the approach of the enemy, spies could have brought the information. Some deep laid scheme must lie hidden behind this mysterious cavalry screen. Thus argued the Japanese who were slow to admit so obvious a tactical error on the part of their adversary. As a matter of fact, General Michtchenko had no great scheme. He was simply committing an elementary mistake which he emphasised by retiring along the main road where he had no opportunity of using his cavalry to ascertain the strength and direction of the Japanese advance. Chapter VI THE NORTHERN ADVANCE.