To be free from disagreeable consciousness is to be in a state which, compared with a state of misery, is a happy state; yet absolute happiness does not exist in the absence of misery, if it does, rocks are happy. It consists, as aforesaid, in agreeable consciousness. That which enables a person to excite or maintain agreeable consciousness is not happiness; but the _idea_ of having such in one's possession is agreeable, and of course is a portion of happiness. Health and wealth go far in enabling a person to excite and maintain agreeable consciousness. That which gives rise to agreeable consciousness is _good_, and we desire it. If we use it intemperately, such use is bad, but the thing itself is still good. Those acts (and intentions are acts of that part of man which intends) of human beings which tend to the promotion of happiness are good, but they are also called _virtuous_, to distinguish them from other things of the same tendency. There is nothing for the word _virtue_ to signify, but virtuous actions. Sin signifies nothing but sinful actions, and sinful, wicked, vicious, or bad actions are those which are productive of more misery than happiness. When an individual gratifies any of his instincts in a _temperate_ degree, he adds an item to the sum total of human happiness, and causes the amount of human happiness to exceed the amount of misery farther than if he had not enjoyed himself, therefore it is virtuous, or, to say the least, it is not vicious or sinful for him to do so. But it must ever be remembered that this temperate degree depends on circumstances; that one person's health, pecuniary circumstances, or social relation may be such that it would cause more misery than happiness for him to do an act which being done by a person under different circumstances would cause more happiness than misery. Therefore, it would be right for the latter to perform such act, but not for the former. Again: owing to his _ignorance_, a man may not be able to gratify a desire without causing misery (wherefore it would be wrong for him to do it), but with knowledge of means to prevent this misery, he may so gratify it that more pleasure than pain will be the result of the act, in which case the act, to say the least, is justifiable. Now, therefore, it is virtuous, nay, it is the _duty_, for him who has a knowledge of such means, to convey it to those who have it not, for by so doing he furthers the cause of human happiness.